As if we needed it, events in the Caucasus over the past week have answered the question Kremlinologists have been asking (admittedly rather perfunctorily) since March – who is really in charge of Russia since Putin’s bizarre gambit to stay in power while relinquishing the presidency? For the answer see any coverage of the war in Georgia, and you’ll notice that President Medvedev has barely been visible, while heroic Vlad, all chinos and tan, makes belligerent noises in Beijing and Vladikavkaz. This is, after all, a personal vendetta being settled, and it’s very much Putin’s project.
Of course I’ve been glued to the news since last Friday when a sad inter-ethnic ‘frozen conflict’ between the Georgians and the South Ossetians was subsumed by a far greater one, a geopolitical firestorm that has been steadily building between Russia and its erstwhile colony Georgia since the ‘Rose Revolution’ of 2003.
Georgia’s relationship with Russia is complex: not only was it a Soviet Republic under Moscow’s total control for 80 years until the break up of the Soviet Union, but for over a century before that it was a colony of imperial Russia. This explains Moscow’s deeply chauvanistic attitude to what it notoriously terms its ‘near abroad’ - Russians live in Georgia, Georgians live in Russia, and Russian remains the day-to-day language of many in Georgia even today. Unlike the Baltic States, another area Russia considers within its sphere of influence despite all evidence to the contrary, which were only swallowed up by the USSR in the 1940s, the Russians and Georgians have been fused together for almost two centuries and as the senior partner in that relationship, Russia has always felt deeply proprietary towards this tiny, mountainous nation.
Georgia’s administrations in the 90s were uniformly close to Moscow, and followed the Russian development model of autocratic kleptocracy with just enough liberal market economics to keep international finance coming in. Yet at the start of the 21st century, the two countries’ paths diverged sharply, Russia moving under Putin towards becoming a centralised oil and gas emirate with a vertical power structure and a resurgent nationalistic ethos brought about by a decade of economic humiliation. Georgia, on the other hand, mired in energy shortages, economic turmoil and faced with an election that had been blatantly stolen by Eduard Shevardnadze in 2003, revolted with the collusion of the US government, to bring about a ‘rose revolution’ that brought the young, telegenic reformer Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Since then the two countries have been in a war of words - the Russians astonished at what they see as Georgia’s treachery, while plucky Georgia has been equally angry at Russian meddling in its affairs.
It’s impossible to overstate the seething hatred that Putin has for Saakashvili. The ex-spook hates American values such as freedom of speech and basic civil liberties per se, let alone when espoused by a Columbia Law School-educated former citizen of the USSR. On a personal level they have always detested each other, and the past few years have seen Russia working behind the scenes playing geopolitical games to undermine Tbilisi in anyway it can, most notably by using the twin sores of the secessionist republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia to provoke a reaction from Georgia. Last week, the hot-tempered Saakashvili finally gave in and took the bait.
Russia’s appalling cynicism in the Caucasus is nothing new (see Chechnya and Dagestan for a litany of betrayal and brutality), but by taking up the cause of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to destabilise Georgia, the Russians have reached a new low. First of all, the inhabitants of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not ethnic Russians, they are simply both ethnic groups that would rather be part of Russia than Georgia and were cut off by the post-Soviet border (that runs sensibly along the Caucasus Mountains, historically dividing the two countries). The Russians, who have played a partisan ‘peace keeping’ force for years in both provinces, have cynically given out Russian passports to both Ossetians and Abkhazians, and are now ‘defending’ ‘their’ citizens against the Georgians.
Of course the Georgian advance was ill advised, and this is the predictable result, but Saakashvili has been resisting these provocations for years now. Just last year the Russians dropped a bomb on Georgian territory in a botched attack on a satellite, a move that provoked outrage in Tbilisi, but little more than mumbles in Brussels or Washington. Previous to that, when Tbilisi expelled a spy ring working out of the Russian embassy in 2006, the result was a national ban of Georgian goods into Russia and the harassment of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgian Russian citizens, many of whom have lived in Russia for decades.
So what’s going on? Russia wants to bring down or at least thoroughly discredit Saakashvili and his pro-Western government, and re-orientate the country to its previous pro-Moscow line. Having let the Baltics slip through its hands at a time when Russia was still economically weak earlier this decade (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined NATO and the EU in 2004, Russia’s economic resurgence beginning shortly afterwards as oil prices began to rise), Russia is not prepared to allow another country bordering one of its most sensitive regions to join the Western alliance without a fight. Moscow will most likely be successful in this, as the vocal US, and to a lesser extent, EU support for Saakashvili and Georgia, has not included anything more than lip service to Georgian NATO membership. We can expect a messy peace, a neutered Georgia and even more bloodshed to come in the Caucasus, as other dormant ethnic wars are reignited.
A resurgent Russia is the greatest political danger facing this planet today. Badly injured, humiliated and angry, this giant nation, drunk on oil wealth and stoking ridiculous acts of nationalism, will not be content with its mere economic resurgence – it wants its empire and influence back. With a cabal of deeply compromised ex-spies, gangsters and other careerists with not a democratic instinct between them in power, we can only expect to see more of events like the war in Georgia in the future. Remember, this is a country that shamelessly – and with seeming impunity – murders its critics using radioactive isotopes in foreign lands, or, in other circumstances, the good old bullet in the head. Ukrainians, who, like the Georgians, have rejected the autocratic path and Moscow line for the liberal democratic one and aspire to join both NATO and the EU, should be watching these events with especial interest, as they could well be next.